Is “practical clout” (the unique combination of inescapability and authority) an essential component of moral judgments? Richard Joyce’s case against moral naturalism is built exactly on such a premise: naturalism without clout is simply not acceptable. The reason, Joyce claims, is very simple: in the absence of clout (the motivator of inescapability), the moral deliberator may legitimately ask himself what kinds of reasons he has “to care about [the particular] instance of moral wrongness” (2006, p.205). And, the possible answers to this crucial question are simply not palatable. Namely, certain persons may reject the existence of any reasons to be concerned by the moral judgment. They may be blasé about stealing “the newspaper in the hotel hallway”, while calmly acknowledging the wrongness of the act. Alternatively, persons may ‘diagnose’ (weak or strong) reasons to perform the action they judge to be moral, and subsequently weigh the reasons for and against the action. But, if this is the case, Joyce is adamant, then surely the desires “to act immorally” can encourage the person to directly modify the pro-morality reasons and desires. That is to say, in the absence of the motivational ‘oomph’, the process of ‘weighing’ reasons can render moral discourse futile – if morality is not authoritative, one can simply discard it in the juggling deliberation of ‘pro’ and  ‘con’ personal reasons. Consequently, either we reject “naturalism without clout” or we acknowledge “moral psychopaths” and eschew the need for distinct moral discourse.

But, in his fervent defense of anti-realism, Joyce situates us on the horns of a false dilemma. Specifically, the absence of practical ‘oomph’ (the authoritative motivational pump) does not directly entail a cold deliberation of reasons. Namely, one may very well posit a motivational mechanism that is contingently connected to the deliberative judgment. The ‘weighing’ of reasons, that Joyce dramatically caricaturizes, does not have to be performed in a motivational vacuum. Quite the contrary, a deliberation that renders an action “morally wrong” can be connected to an emotional mechanism and ‘motivate’ the performance of the action (this does not imply a necessary, intrinsic connection). In such a model, the moral judgment triggers an emotional response, and the salience of that response is dependent on the perceived severity of the moral transgression. Thus, contingently, one will be motivated to act in accordance with the moral deliberation; but this would not imply motivational internalism (psychopaths do exist, and their judgment-motivation connection is simply severed – that’s why they are psychopaths!)[1]. In addition, this type of model helps us fight Joyce’s second objection: the obsolescence of moral discourse. Namely, the absence of practical clout (remember: practical clout implies inescapability!) doesn’t render moral discourse futile – a contingent link between moral deliberation and motivation effectively “saves the day”: it explains the utility of a distinctly moral discourse while rejecting the inescapability implied by the moral ‘oomph’. And, to follow Joyce in the excursion to “common-sense land”, isn’t this precisely what we encounter in everyday life? Isn’t the combination of motivation and deliberative distance what we usually associate with moral judging? That is, while murder certainly is a particularly intense motivational pump (severity influences the emotional salience), is the same really the case with “stealing a tomato from a supermarket as a child”? To reduce Joyce’s claim to an absurdity, isn’t there something truly monstrous (Kantian monstrous!?) about a person who is completely overwhelmed by the ‘oomph’ of “not stealing a newspaper from a hotel hallway”?[2] The total loss of deliberative distance (the weighing of reasons) is, effectively, something that is rarely encountered in everyday life, and not the distance itself (as Freudians have insisted for decades: not only is moral judgment compatible with an additional ‘weighing’ of reasons, but very often guilt itself is a reason to transgress – the thrill of the guilt in cheating, for example).

Conclusively, Joyce’s case against “naturalism without clout” is very weak. It fails in at least two ways: a) by imposing a false dilemma while overlooking the possibility of contingent motivation; and b) by misrepresenting the common-sense picture of moral judging. As sympathetic as an anti-realist (like myself) can be towards Joyce, this is far from rendering naturalism guilty “beyond reasonable doubt”.

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[1] To insist on the contrary is to endorse a methodologically cheap version of motivational internalism: psychopaths do not make moral judgments simply because they cannot, per definitionem, make a moral judgment

[2] According to an old humorous psychoanalytic dictum, “the true madman is not the beggar who thinks he is the king, but the king who thinks he is really a king”. Perhaps we should postulate a similar meta-ethical formula: the true freak is not the one who wonders whether there are any reasons to act morally, but the one who is so “practically oomphed” that he cannot think of a reason to act amorally.

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