Is moral discourse futile in the absence of a categorical 'oomph'?

Is “practical clout” (the unique combination of inescapability and authority) an essential component of moral judgments? Richard Joyce’s case against moral naturalism is built exactly on such a premise: naturalism without clout is simply not acceptable. The reason, Joyce claims, is very simple: in the absence of clout (the motivator of inescapability), the moral deliberator may legitimately ask himself what kinds of reasons he has “to care about [the particular] instance of moral wrongness” (2006, p.205). And, the possible answers to this crucial question are simply not palatable. Namely, certain persons may reject the existence of any reasons to be concerned by the moral judgment. They may be blasé about stealing “the newspaper in the hotel hallway”, while calmly acknowledging the wrongness of the act. Alternatively, persons may ‘diagnose’ (weak or strong) reasons to perform the action they judge to be moral, and subsequently weigh the reasons for and against the action. But, if this is the case, Joyce is adamant, then surely the desires “to act immorally” can encourage the person to directly modify the pro-morality reasons and desires. That is to say, in the absence of the motivational ‘oomph’, the process of ‘weighing’ reasons can render moral discourse futile – if morality is not authoritative, one can simply discard it in the juggling deliberation of ‘pro’ and  ‘con’ personal reasons. Consequently, either we reject “naturalism without clout” or we acknowledge “moral psychopaths” and eschew the need for distinct moral discourse.

But, in his fervent defense of anti-realism, Joyce situates us on the horns of a false dilemma. Specifically, the absence of practical ‘oomph’ (the authoritative motivational pump) does not directly entail a cold deliberation of reasons. Continue reading