Pete carried over our discussion of the plane of immanence to Deontologistics. In his response to my emphasis of Deleuze’s constructivism, he has put forward a wonderfully nuanced argument, with several very interesting points. Nevertheless, the central claim of the text, which I think addresses directly the kernel of our misunderstanding, is the highlighting of the double use of the notion of the plane in Deleuze. Pete presents the difference between the epistemological notion of the plane (compatible with the explicit constructivism) and the respective ontological notion (which is a reworking of Spinoza’s Substance). It is from a conflation of these separate notions, he argues, that an idealist interpretation of Deleuze emerges. To put it bluntly, if we read the ontological notion of the plane as a philosophical posit, then idealism is a necessary consequence.

Now, I admit; perhaps I have been unclear in the presentation of my initial argument, since the manner in which Pete attacks it is fascinatingly close to my very exposition of it (and its linkage with constructivism). The central idea is very simple: THE plane of immanence is a phenomenological residue, because it is an unwarranted transposition of an epistemological notion into an ontological model. Continue reading