Recently I re-read Fodor’s seminal paper Banish DisContent (1986), in which “good old Jerry” criticizes the ostracism of propositional attitudes from neural semantics. Entertaining as ever, Fodor starts with a brilliant paragraph:

“It is a curiosity of the philosophical temperament, this passion for radical solutions. Do you feel a little twinge in your epistemology? Absolute skepticism is the thing to try. Has the logic of confirmation got you down? Probably physics is a fiction. Worried about individuating objects? Don’t let anything in but sets… Apparently the rule is: if aspirin doesn’t work, try cutting off your head”

As attractive as a comment on Fodor’s  acerbity might be, the appeal to bring this up is tied to a much more mundane point: the “recognition of philosophical radicals” in the contemporary Continental scene. Continue reading